Bank Seasoned Equity Offers: Do Voluntary & Involuntary Offers Differ?

Introduction
Several recent papers have examined the impact of the discount at which seasoned equity is offered relative to the stock price just preceding the offer date. Specifically, this body of research has examined the market reaction to the offer price discount for utilities and industrial issuers. 1 The results are that the seasoned equity offering (SEO) issue day price reaction is more negative the larger the offer price discount (OPD). Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) argue that the offer price discount is a signaling device that investment bankers use to apprise their buy-side clients (the capital suppliers) of the potential quality of the SEO firm, based upon the investment bankers' updated information.
Prior academic research, including Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) , has excluded bank SEOs while analyzing the impact of the OPD. However, bank SEOs provide an interesting setting to examine the OPD-effect because Cornett and Tehranian (1994) document that all bank issues are not created equal. They argue that bank SEOs should not be pooled together and examined as one non-differentiated group. Cornett and Tehranian segregate seasoned equity offers (SEOs) made by banks that are already adequately capitalized from SEOs where the issuing institution has fallen below the capital adequacy standard. 2 The former are called "voluntary" and the latter are labeled "involuntary" SEOs. They argue that voluntary offers are possibly made by opportunistic managers, who find their stock overvalued and seek to capitalize on that opportunity (a la Myers and Majluf (1984) ). On the other hand, managers may have limited discretion to time involuntary offers because such issues are made under duress from bank regulators. Consistent with their reasoning, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) find that the price reaction to SEO announcements is significantly more negative for voluntary offers.
1 Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) examine industrial offers, Singh (1997) examines utilities, and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine a combination of industrials and utilities. 2 Banks are required to follow capital adequacy requirements and regulators monitor whether banks are adhering to that minimum acceptable standard.
We consider bank SEOs to be particularly interesting because equity offers by industrial firms and utilities are not distinguishable into voluntary and involuntary offers. If the motivations behind voluntary and involuntary issues are potentially different, it is not obvious that the Offer Price Discount (OPD) effect should be the same across the two types of offers. If involuntary offers are made by relatively poorly performing banks then OPD may be higher for such offers to compensate the investment bank's buy-side clients for the risk they are taking. If involuntary offers are made at relatively shorter notice under duress from the regulators, then again OPD may be higher for such offers. On the other hand, investment bankers may set deeper discounts for voluntary offers if such offers are perceived as opportunistic action. Moreover, the information content of the OPD may not be the same across the two classes of issues; that is, the market may react differently to the same amount of discount across the two types of issues because the poor performance and undercapitalization of the involuntary issuers are observable and may already be priced in.
Thus, the OPD effect for voluntary and involuntary SEOs is an unresolved empirical issue: it is not evident whether the OPD effect exists for banks, and it is not obvious if the OPD is used as a signaling device, and whether the effect of this signal is different for voluntary and involuntary offers. To resolve these issues, we ask the following question in this paper: Does the magnitude and information content of the offer price discount vary across voluntary and involuntary issuers?
Consistent with the literature, we find that the greater the offer price discount (OPD) relative to the price on the previous day, the more negative the offer day price reaction. Surprisingly, however, we find no significant differences in the issue-date discount, in issuedate discount surprises, in the market's reaction to discount surprises, in the 60-day postissue abnormal returns run-up, and in the one-year post-issue abnormal returns between voluntary and involuntary offers.
The lack of a difference between the stock price reactions to voluntary and involuntary offers at the offer date and in the post-issue period is unexpected, in light of Cornett and Tehranian (1994) . To further explore this lack of difference between investors' reaction to voluntary and involuntary offers, we examine the announcement day returns for the two classes of bank SEOs, as in Cornett and Tehranian (1994) . We find no difference even in the announcement day returns between voluntary and involuntary offers. We restrict our study period to 1983 -1989 to match Cornett and Tehranians' (1994 Cornett and Tehranian (1994) . We find that both involuntary and voluntary SEOs are timed after a significant stock price run-up and that the run-up does not differ across the two classes of bank SEOs. If the pre-event run-up is evidence of managerial opportunism and ability to time the SEO, then the fact that it does not differ across the two types of bank SEOs is evidence that managers are able to time the involuntary offers just as well.
The examination of one-year post-issue long-run abnormal returns for the two types of bank seasoned equity issues reveals two new results. 3 The post-issue long-run returns are positive for both voluntary and involuntary offerings, and the difference is insignificant.
Our results do not support the notion that investors react differently to voluntary and involuntary SEOs. Our results do not support Cornett and Tehranian's findings for our entire sample period (1983 -1999) or for the period employed in their study (1983 -1989) . Our results are robust when we limit our attention to large issuers (assets greater than $1 billion) and large issues (issue proceeds greater than 1% of total assets). One explanation for our finding is the fact that tapping outside equity is an expensive form of raising capital. Banks often use alternatives methods to fix their capital adequacy problems, such as restricting asset growth. 4 Thus, resorting to an SEO to raise additional equity to meet capital adequacy requirements may strike investors in much the same way as they regard SEOs by wellcapitalized banks.
3 We compute the long-run returns in different ways: the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns and the Fama-French factors risk adjusted returns. We lose only one bank that does not survive the twelvemonths following the issue. 4 These alternative methods include cutting growth, shrinking in size, retaining a larger fraction of their earnings, and adjusting their balance sheet towards assets with lower capital charge. For example, a bank can sell its mortgage portfolio and replace it with mortgage-backed securities. This arrangement reduces a bank's credit risk exposure and cuts its capital charge by more than half (4 cents for every dollar in mortgages versus 1.6 cents for every dollar in Government Sponsored Enterprise backed Mortgage Backed Securities).
A second contribution of our paper is the following. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) find that SEO offer dates are accompanied by a marked increase in trading volume. We also check to see if there is an increase in trading volume for bank SEOs and whether it holds across the two types of bank offerings. We find that the trading volume increases dramatically at the offer date relative to a pre-event "normal" trading volume benchmark. Interestingly, we find that although the trading activity reduces within a few days (relative to the immediate postissue peak) it stays at abnormally high levels over a 60-day post-offer period and it is accompanied by a positive abnormal return in the post-offer period. Again, we do not find any difference in the increased trading volume or the post-issue abnormal returns between the voluntary and involuntary offers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Voluntary and Involuntary SEOs
Our data comprises public issues of seasoned equity made by commercial banks and Bank Figure 1 shows the number of SEOs made by banks and BHCs in our final sample spanning 1983-1999, in chronological order. We look at the minimum total capital ratio a bank must attain to be considered "wellcapitalized" according to the Federal Reserve guidelines (or "Zone 1" before the "well-capitalized" zone was established by FDICIA). Between 1983 and 1989, this regulatory requirement in terms of total capital ratio was 7 percent (also see Cornett and Tehranian (1994) Figure 2 shows the distribution of VL and IVL issues on a year-by-year basis. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our sample of 239 bank SEOs. Table 1 here The average bank size in our final sample is around $14 billion in total assets, and the average SEO size is 1.66 percent of total assets. The average CMR score is around 8, indicating that the bank SEOs are brought to the market by high quality investment banks on average. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample segregated into VL and IVL issues. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) , and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine the discount of seasoned equity offer price relative to the stock price just preceding the offer date for utilities and industrials. Following these papers, we compute the offer price discount, Discount, as
, where P -1 is closing price on the day before the offering day, and OP is the offer price. All stock price and returns data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean Discount is 1.55% for IVL issues and 1.85% for the VL issues, both of which are significant. Their difference, however, is statistically insignificant. Thus, investment banks seem to offer equity of both the VL and the IVL issuers at relatively the same (significant) discount to the last closing price. Table 3 here
Discount Surprise
However, as Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) argue, part of the Discount calculated above may have been expected by investors. Discount may be expected to increase with the relative amount of the offer (issue size relative to the issuer's market value of equity (MVE) a week before the issue) because of adverse selection and placement pressure. Discount may also be higher when the stock price is low because marketing of a low-priced stock may be more difficult, or when stock return volatility is high to compensate investors for the risk. Noting that issue date discount can be a function of the lead underwriter pedigree, the exchange in which the issue is listed, and the issue type (VL or IVL), we calculate discount surprise as the residual, e D , of the following regression:
where, following Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), P -5 is the closing price 5 days before the Issue date, and stdev (-121,-22 ) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 day period from 121 days before the issue date through 22 days before the issue date. We compute the market-adjusted return on the issue date, MARISS(i,j), as , where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq valueweighted market returns. The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables:
lnIssue, the natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, and lnMVE, the natural log of the market value of equity as computed 7 days before the offer date. The lead underwriter reputation is measured by Table 3 shows that the distributions of the discount surprise, e D , are almost identical for the VL and IVL issues. Panel B shows that the only significant determinants of Discount are the intercept terms (VL and IVL), which are statistically indistinguishable; none of the above-mentioned observable variables are.
We next examine whether the issue date returns are different for VL and IVL issues.
Returns and Volume around Issue Date
The issue date returns, MARISS (0,0), are insignificantly different from zero for both VL and IVL issues (see Panel A of Table 4 ). Table 4 show that there is significant price and volume run-up in the 60 days post issue for both VL and IVL issues. The post-issue marketadjusted abnormal return, MARISS (1, 60) , is in excess of 6% for IVL issues and over 5% for VL issues. MARISS (1, 60) are insignificantly different from each other for VL and IVL issues.
The cumulative traded volume for IVL stocks is over 400% higher in the 60-day post-issue period as compared to the 60-day pre-issue period. The cumulative traded volume for VL stocks is over 500% higher in the 60-day post-issue period as compared to the 60-day preissue period. We also examine separately banks that have greater than $1 billion in total assets at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement ("big" issuers) and "big" issues: issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total assets of a bank. Similar results obtain.
Panel B and C of Table 4 show the results. Thus, we find that there is a significant trading volume build-up and stock prices also increase for both types of bank offers in the post-issue period.
To examine the link between issue-date returns and issue-date discount, we regress MARISS (0,0) on the discount surprise. Other factors like the extent of undercapitalization or overcapitalization of a bank immediately prior to the issue announcement, or the pedigree of the investment bank bringing the issue to the market could influence market reaction to issue announcements. Therefore, we control for other possible factors that may influence issue date returns using the following regression specification:
where e D is the discount surprise. The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is the dollar amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the capital requirements as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. The degree of overcapitalization, OverCap, is the dollar amount by which the equity capital exceeds the capital requirements as a fraction of total assets, at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. X is a vector of control variables that comprises lnAsset, lnIssue, CMR, PreBasel, and Transition. The variables, lnIssue and CMR have already been defined before, lnAsset is the natural log of the total assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter immediately preceding issue announcement, PreBasel is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred before the Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was announced in 1988, and Transition is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred after the Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was announced but before its implementation was completed in 1992. Table 5 shows that the only significant determinant of the issue date returns is the issue date discount surprise. The bigger the discount surprise, the lower the market-adjusted issue date returns, for both VL and IVL issues. Thus, the market reacts significantly negatively to the news of discount on issue date. This is in line with the results found by others for industrials and utilities.
We formally test whether the VL and IVL coefficients are the same in terms of their effects on MARISS (0,0), and find that they are insignificantly different from each other. We account for the effects of undercapitalization and overcapitalization by examining how different [VL
, and find that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues at their respective mean levels of capitalization in terms of the issue date and postissue returns. Although the discount surprise effect on issue date returns is significantly negative for both VL and IVL issues, it is significantly more so for VL issues than for IVL issues. In other words, although both types of issues feature discounts of the same magnitude, the information content of discount seems to be more for VL issuers. One likely reason is that the undercapitalization of the IVL issuers was observable to the market and perhaps these issuers have already been subjected to greater market scrutiny. Consequently, there is relatively lower new information content in the offer price discount for IVL issuers. Table 5 shows that there is significant positive relation between the post-issue volume runup and abnormal returns, for both VL and IVL issues. As the traded volume increases, the abnormal returns also increase significantly in the 60-day period immediately after the issue.
To summarize, we find that there are no significant differences in the issue date discount for VL and IVL issues, no difference in the distributions of discount surprises, no significant difference in issue date abnormal returns, no significant differences in the post-issue traded volume run-up, and in the post-issue abnormal returns. Does a returns difference manifest itself in the long-run? To examine this, we compare the post-issue one-year long-run returns for the VL and IVL issues. 6
Post-Issue 1 year Long-run Returns
Appropriate measures of long-run returns have been extensively discussed in the literature in recent years. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are appealing because the implied investment strategy is both simple and representative of the returns a long horizon investor might earn. However, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that calendar time methods may be less likely to yield spurious rejections of the zero null hypotheses than buyand-hold returns, partly because buy-and-hold returns can exaggerate small initial differences through compounding. We control for the skewness of Buy-and-hold abnormal returns by using skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistics to evaluate significance. We also compute FFAR, the Fama-French three-factors-risk-adjusted returns, in addition to BHAR, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq valueweighted market return for the market adjustments. From investors' point of view, recent work by Fama and French (1992 , 1993 , 1995 indicates that a three-factor model of risk-adjustments may explain the cross section of stock returns. Their three factors are RM, the excess return on the market portfolio, SMB, the return on a zero investment portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a small firm portfolio from the return on a big firm portfolio, and HML, the return on a zero investment portfolio calculated as the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of low book-tomarket stocks. 7 The Fama-French calendar time series regression model is given by:
where r it is the excess return on stock or portfolio i over period t, and ε is an error term. The coefficients b, s and h are time-invariant risk-loadings. The regression intercept a measures the risk-adjusted abnormal return. As Gompers and Lerner (2003) emphasize, it has an interpretation analogous to that of Jensen's alpha in a CAPM framework.
The one-year post-issue BHAR (1, 12) and FFAR(1, 12) , computed on a monthly basis from one month after the issue to 12 months after the issue, are shown in Panel A of Table 6 . 
Panel B of pre-announcement capitalization in terms of the 1-year post-issue performance. We also find that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues from the perspective of the offer price discount surprise effect on the 1-year post-issue performance.
We find that there are no significant differences in the issue-date discount, in issue-date discount surprises, in issue-date abnormal returns, in the 60-day post-issue traded volume and abnormal returns run-up, and in the one-year post issue risk adjusted returns for VL and IVL issues. The question then is: Do investors perceive the VL and IVL issues to be different when they are announced? Do the investors think that the ability of the management to optimally time SEOs is limited in IVL issues as compared to the VL issues? To answer these questions, we examine the announcement date market reaction to VL and IVL issues.
Announcement Date Returns
We calculate the post-issue abnormal returns, MARAD(i,j) as , where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market returns. Following standard event study methodology, we compute MARAD (-1, +1) , the market-adjusted announcement period returns from the day before the announcement date to the end of the day after the announcement date. We choose a 3-day window because some investors might receive information in advance of the formal announcement. It is likely that the market is informed after the filing because the filing notice is not always available on Dow Jones News Service until a day later (see Irvine and Rosenfeld, 2000) . However, we also analyze MARAD (-3, +3) to capture the announcement effect over an extended window. Cornett and Tehranian (1994) show that investors take into account managerial discretion to optimally time equity issues, when they react to SEO announcements. In their sample of 120 bank SEOs made in the period 1983-1989, they show that the average stock price decline in the announcement period for VL issues are significantly negative (market adjusted abnormal return = -1.56%), while the announcement period average stock price decline for IVL issues is insignificantly different from zero (market adjusted abnormal return = -0.64%).
We find that the average MARAD(-1,+1) for both IVL and VL issues are significantly negative (-0.94% and -1.00% respectively) for the full sample (see Table 7 ). 8 Table 7 here Thus, we find that the market reacts significantly negatively to both types of issues. In fact, the average abnormal stock price decline is more negative for the IVL issues in the (-3,+3) window than for the VL issues, but not significantly so. The average MARAD(-3,+3) is -1.84% for IVL issues and -0.77% for VL issues. In other words, in contrast to Cornett and Tehranian's findings, we find that equity issue announcements, whether voluntary or 8 (-60,-4) , is significantly positive for each and statistically indistinguishable. 9 Our results suggest that both the VL and IVL issuers time their SEOs after a stock price run-up.
We also compute MARAD(-1,+1) as where r(t) = β 1 v(t-2) + β 2 v(t-1) +β 3 v(t) + β 4 v(t+1)+ β 5 v(t+2) + e(t).
We control for other possible influencers of announcement period returns, and then examine market reaction to VL and IVL issues, in a multivariate setting using the following regression specifications: announcements. We also find that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues from the perspective of how the pre-announcement run-up influences the announcement period returns. The conclusion is that the investors do not react differently to voluntary and involuntary bank seasoned equity issues
Conclusion
We examine the size and the information content of the offer price discount for seasoned equity offerings made by banks. Cornett and Tehranian (1994) segregate bank seasoned equity offers (SEOs) into voluntary and involuntary offers. They contend that involuntary issues are made by banks under duress from bank examiners because they are not adequately capitalized. Accordingly, the "window of opportunity" or issue timing discretion is limited for such offers. On the other hand, voluntary issues are made by already well capitalized banks and are likely made by opportunistic managers when their stock is overvalued. The objective of this study is to examine whether the offer price discount and the associated price effects are different for involuntary offerings from those made by banks that are already adequately capitalized prior to the issue announcement.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Singh (1997) , and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) have examined the price effects of the offer price discounts for industrial firms and utilities' SEOs only. Our results for bank SEOs are consistent with the findings of prior research. We find that the offer price discount and the issue-day price reaction are significant for bank seasoned equity offerings as well. However, the offer-price discount, the unanticipated component of the discount and/or the issue-day price reaction is not significantly different for involuntary issues as compared to the voluntary issues. This is a surprising finding because involuntary offers are more likely to be made by relatively poorly performing banks, and by banks that were forced to raise equity capital at short notice to avoid the Prompt Corrective Action sanctions imposed by the regulators, for which the discount can be expected to be higher.
Prior literature (Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) , Altinkilic and Hansen (2003)) has documented an increase in trade volume at the offer date. We also examine bank stocks immediately after the SEO. We find that in the short run post-issue period, the trade volume and the stock price moves up significantly for both voluntary issues and involuntary issues.
We check the immediate offer period through 60-days after the issue. We find a significant Post-1998 SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT Include Unrealized holding gains on equity securities (UGE) (restricted)
1995-1998
Upto 45 percent of UGE may be included in Tier 2 Table A. 
Calculations of total capital ratio for Banks
This table shows year-by-year detailed calculations of total capital ratio for banks. Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Asset Base.
Period
Tier 1 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Bank SEOs Segregated into Voluntary and Involuntary Issuers
This table shows the average, the median, the minimum and the maximum values of several issue-and issuer-related variables for our sample of 239 commercial bank and bank holding company (together referred to as banks) SEOs, segregated into Voluntary (VL) and Involuntary (IVL) issues. The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is the dollar amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the capital requirements as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. The degree of overcapitalization, OverCap, is the dollar amount by which the equity capital exceeds the capital requirements as a fraction of total assets, at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement.
Involuntary Sample n = 65
Voluntary Sample n = 174 (-121,-22 ) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 day period from 121 days before the issue date through 22 days before the issue date. Market-adjusted return on the issue date,
MARISS(i,j), as
, where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market returns. The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables: lnIssue, the natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, and lnMVE, the natural log of the market value of equity as computed 7 days before the offer date. Nasdaq is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the stock trades on Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise. MARISS(0, 0) , the 60 days post-issue abnormal returns, MARISS (1, 60) , and the post-issue abnormal traded volume, Volume (1, 60) , which is the percent excess cumulative traded volume of a stock from 1 day after the issue date to 60 days after the issue date, relative to its cumulative traded volume over the 60 day period before issue announcement. Panel B shows the distributional statistics of MARISS (0, 0), MARISS(1, 60), and Volume(1, 60) for banks that have greater than $1 billion in total assets at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement ("big" issuers), and Panel C for "big" issues: issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total assets of a bank. 0.87 *** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
Panel A -All SEOs
Table 6 Post-Issue one-year Long Run Returns
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the 1-year post-issue long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR (1,12) ), and the 1-year post-issue Fama-French factors risk adjusted return (FFAR(1,12)) (both computed on a monthly basis from the 1 st month after the issue to the 12 th month after the issue) for voluntary and involuntary issues. For BHAR(1,12) , skewness-adjusted t-statistics are computed and compared against bootstrapped critical values (over 1,000 replications) to assess significance.
Panel B shows the regression coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) when BHAR (1, 12) and FFAR (1, 12) are regressed on several issuer-and issue-specific variables using the following regression specifications: 
MARISS(0,0) x IVL versus MARISS(0,0) x VL).
( 0.77 0.02 *** † † † denotes significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level using skewness-adjusted t -statistics. The skewness-adjusted t-statistics are computed and compared against bootstrapped critical values (over 1,000 replications) to assess significance. *** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. MARAD(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted announcement period returns from the day before the announcement date to the day after the announcement date, MARAD (-3, 3 ) is the market-adjusted announcement period returns from 3 date before announcement date to 3 days after the announcement date, and MARAD (-60,-4 iii) β 5 = β 6 0.37 0.57 0.74 0.22 *** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
Figure 1 Number of Bank Seasoned Equity Offerings in 1983-1999
This figure shows how many of the 239 bank SEOs in our sample are issued by commercial banks and by bank holding companies in the 1983-1999 period. 
